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Economic Perspective 2 
BUS REGULATIOH Dl SOOTLAHD - A REVIEW OF THE FIRST SIX MOUTHS 
by 
John Farrington, Transport Research Group, University of Aberdeen 
and Tony Mackay, Mackay Consultants, Inverness 
Local bus s e r v i c e s in Scotland were 
deregulated in 1986. Since then there has 
been a substantial increase in the supply 
of bus services and strong competition in 
the four main c i t i e s , par t i cu la r ly in 
Glasgow. This a r t i c l e reviews the 
experience of deregulation over the f i r s t 
six months. 
Introduction 
The 1985 Transport Act introduced the 
doctrines of market forces, competition 
and p r iva t i s a t ion in to the previously 
regulated system of the supply of local 
bus services. Since the 1930s control had 
been exercised through route l icenses 
granted by regional Traffic Commissioners, 
a quasi-judicial office whose function as 
d e f i n e d in s u c c e s s i v e p i e c e s of 
l e g i s l a t i o n was to secure a publ ic 
t ransport service in accordance with the 
needs of the area. Integral to t h i s 
system was cross-subsidy within large 
o p e r a t o r s be tween p r o f i t a b l e and 
unprofitable routes. Indeed, this was an 
explicit aim of the regulatory system and 
as a consequence of the need to protect 
operators' t e r r i t o r i e s , market entry was 
made difficult . 
In this way unprofitable, mostly rural and 
off-peak, services could be provided at no 
cost to the public purse. Additionally 
t h e T r a f f i c C o m m i s s i o n e r s had 
responsibilities for operator safety, thus 
encompassing both quantity and qual i ty 
control. 
Clearly the continued s t a b i l i t y of the 
regulated supply of bus services depended 
in par t icu la r on the balance between 
ope ra t ing l o s s e s on some r o u t e s and 
ope ra t ing p r o f i t s on o t h e r s , with 
sufficient surplus for capital investments 
and overhead cos ts . Bus operators were 
able to sustain t h i s s i tua t ion against 
railway competition between the two world 
wars, and both bus and r a i l t ransport 
experienced a boom in the 1940s and early 
1950s, as wartime-suppressed demand for 
t r a v e l was f u l f i l l e d . However, car 
ownership, which began to increase rapidly 
in the 1950s and surged ahead in the 
1960s, began to undermine the framework of 
supply based on cross-subsidy which was an 
intrinsic feature of bus operations. 
In 1961 the Jack Committee (HMSO) 
ident i f ied a need for the inject ion of 
funds to sustain the level of bus services 
in rural areas and in the 1968 Transport 
Act this proposal was implemented, local 
a u t h o r i t i e s ( coun t ies ) being given 
discret ionary powers to subsidise bus 
o p e r a t o r s . The t h r u s t of t h i s new 
direct ion was emphasised in the 1972 and 
1973 Local Government Acts, the Scott ish 
regions being required to secure the 
provision of public transport adequate for 
the needs of t h e i r a r ea s . Annual 
Traansport Policies and Programmes (TPPs) 
produced by the regional councils were in 
effect a bid for finance to be used in 
t ransport spending, including revenue 
support payments to bus operators. 
However, through the 1970s the funds being 
provided through the Rate Support Grant 
came under i nc reas ing p re s su re both 
in te rna l ly , as o ther counci l budgets 
competed for resources, and externally, as 
central government exercised controls on 
public spending. Increasing use of cars, 
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encouraged by road improvements, reduced 
bus r e v e n u e s and t h e s p i r a l l i n g 
implications of revenue support were 
becoming a high cost item in regional 
council expenditure. 
In the early 1980s the large operators 
(the state-owned Scottish Bus Group and 
the municipal undertakings) carried out 
market analysis (SCOTMAP) and produced 
increased efficiencies by tailoring supply 
more c lose ly to demand. The r u r a l 
networks in Scotland survived SCOTMAP 
largely in tac t . Only a few routes were 
to ta l ly l o s t , though frequencies were 
reduced (Farrington & Harrison, 1985) on 
many rural routes, with a corresponding 
supply increase in areas of high demand 
and market potent ia l , which were mainly 
urban. Despite these improvements in 
e f f i c i ency , however, revenue support 
payments continued to increase. 
Towards deregulation 
The 1980 Transport Act in t roduced 
de regu la t ion of long d i s t ance bus 
services, resul t ing in a rapid expansion 
of a pre-existing competitive trend among 
bus operators and between bus and r a i l 
services. Fares were reduced, supply 
increased and vehicle quali ty improved. 
The market expanded, partly at the expense 
of rai l traffic (eg British Rail admitted 
to a loss of £15 million revenue per year 
after the 1980 Act) and partly through 
genertion of new traffic. This experience 
appeared to encourage the view t h a t 
deregulation could be applied successfully 
to local bus services, though opponents 
pointed out that demand e l a s t i c i t y would 
undoubtedly be lower in the local context. 
Probably even more encouraging for 
advocates of de regu la t ion was the 
experience of the 'Tr ia l Areas'. These 
were enabled under the 1980 Transport Act 
but only three au thor i t ies applied for 
Trial Area status - Norfolk (part), Devon 
(part) and Hereford and Worcester. None 
of these included urban areas and 
deregulation of the type embodied in the 
1985 Transport Act was applied only in 
Hereford and Worcester. These short term 
r e s u l t s were adduced in support of 
deregulation s ince f a r e s and revenue 
suport payments 'decreased. Despite the 
absence of any o ther exper imenta l 
deregulation, including urban or Scottish 
experience, the 1984 White Paper 'Buses' 
(HMSO) proposed deregulation of local bus 
s e r v i c e s (Mackay 1984) and t h i s was 
carried through in the 1985 Transport Act. 
The 1985 Transport Act 
The aims of this legislation, as promoted 
in the preceding White Paper, can be 
summarised as: 
1. To introduce competition into the 
supply of local bus services. 
2. To inc rease consumer choice , and 
supply levels. 
3. To reduce fares. 
4. To el iminate cross-subsidy within 
operators' networks. 
5. To produce subsidy t ransparency , 
allowing the clear ident i f ica t ion of 
'value for money1 in revenue support 
payments. 
6. To reduce the total amount of revenue 
support. 
7. To m a i n t a i n s a f e t y l e v e l s by 
reinforcing quality control. 
8. To encourage innovation. 
9. To maintain a supply of bus services 
in areas of social need. 
The mechanisms incorporated in the Act, by 
which these aims were to be accomplished, 
are lengthy but the main provision can be 
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summarised as: 26 October 1986: 
Operators are free to enter the market 
subject to r eg i s t r a t i on of new or 
changed services at six weeks notice, 
the r eg i s t r a t ion authority being the 
Traffic Commissioner. 
The T r a f f i c Commiss ioner has 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for ensuring t h a t 
q u a l i t y c o n t r o l s t a n d a r d s a r e 
maintained. He also has the power to 
call public enquiries into situations 
alleged to be causing severe t r a f f i c 
conges t ion . The Office of Fa i r 
Trading (OFT) has the power to 
inves t iga te a l l e g a t i o n s of unfa i r 
competition. 
Deregulation takes force. This was 
followed by a standstil l period during 
which operators were not allowed to 
vary the i r r eg i s t r a t ion . (In some 
areas deregulation effectively began 
in stages from June 1986.) 
26 January 1987: 
Full deregulation in force, with free 
market entry and exit for commercial, 
registered services subject to 42 
days' notice. 
Regional Councils are not if ied of 
r e g i s t r a t i o n s and t h e i r r o a d s 
departments, together with the police, 
consult with the i r public t ransport 
u n i t s on t r a f f i c and s a f e t y 
implications of registered services. 
Regional Councils are empowered to 
secure the provision of ' soc ia l ' bus 
s e r v i c e s where i t i s f e l t t h a t 
regis tered 'commercial' services do 
not provide the necessary supply 
level, or are absent altogether. This 
i s achieved by invi t ing operators to 
tender for s p e c i f i e d r o u t e s , the 
lowest tender normally being accepted. 
Concessionary fare arrangements (paid 
for by r eg iona l counc i l s ) a re to 
continue. 
Municipal and PTE ope ra to r s in 
Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and 
Glasgow were to become s e p a r a t e 
companies. 
Monitoring of deregulation 
Monitoring the effects and implications of 
deregulation i s being carried out by a 
variety of bodies and in t e re s t groups. 
'Buswatch' is a mainly voluntary system of 
monitoring local effects on services, and 
is co-ordinated from Lancaster University. 
The Scottish Office has commissioned work 
from Newcastle University, based on case 
study a reas d i s t r i b u t e d throughout 
Scotland and a review of regional council 
policies. The transport and Road Research 
Laboratory includes Scott ish regional 
councils in i t s review of policy in the 
deregulated environment and a survey of 
d e r e g u l a t i o n ' s e f f e c t s in Passenger 
Transport Executive (PTE) areas being 
carried out by the Transport Studies Unit 
a t Oxford, funded by the Association of 
Metropolitan Authorit ies and the PTEs, 
includes the Strathclyde PTE in i t s remit. 
D e r e g u l a t i o n was t o p roceed t o a 
prescribed timetable, the main features of 
which were: 
by 28 February 1986: 
Notification by operators of intention 
to operate registered services, giving 
time for the regions to secure tenders 
before; 
In addition to these studies, the Scottish 
Consumer Council (SCC) commissioned a 
monitoring programme to cover the effects 
of d e r e g u l a t i o n throughout mainland 
Scotland, to be carried out jo in t ly by 
Mackay Consultants of Inverness and the 
Transport Research Group of Aberdeen 
University. The review of deregulation 
impacts in Scotland presented in t h i s 
a r t i c l e i s based on the findings of t h i s 
work, conducted between October 1986 and 
April 1987, and represents the views of 
the authors. A full report was published 
recently by the SCC. 
The objectives of the work were to report 
on t he e f f e c t s of d e r e g u l a t i o n , 
s p e c i f i c a l l y the fol lowing t o p i c s : 
service charac te r i s t i c s including fares, 
frequencies, r e l i a b i l i t y and qual i ty ; 
unfair competition, i f any; the effects 
on revenue support leve ls ; any problems 
with access to bus s ta t ions ; f a c i l i t i e s 
for the disabled; schools transport. The 
informat ion required was obtained by 
interviews with regional council officers, 
bus operators, the Traffic Commissioner 
and OFT, and SCC's Consumer Network 
provided feedback from consumers on 
passengers' views of service changes etc. 
The structure of the Scottish bus industry 
Local bus services in Scotland have been 
dominated by the Scottish Bus Group and 
the four municipal a u t h o r i t i e s in 
Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and 
Glasgow/Strathclyde. The l a t t e r had a 
near monopoly of services in the four 
c i t ies , while the SBG through i t s various 
subsidiaries provided most of the services 
elsewhere. There were a number of small 
independents throughout Scotland, with 
particular strength in Ayrshire. 
According to Scottish Office s t a t i s t i c s 
(Scottish Office) the number of buses 
(vehicle stock) in Scotland in 1984 was 
8,389, of which the SBG accounted for 
36.6$, the local au thor i t ies (including 
Strathclyde PTE) 21.7% and the independent 
or p r i v a t e ope ra to r s 41.8%. Vehicle 
kilometres in 1984 totalled 431.8 million, 
with the SBG providing 46.5%, the local 
au thor i t ies 32.1% and the independents 
21.3%. Of the to ta l vehicle kilometres, 
the stage (or local) services accounted 
for 66.1%, e x p r e s s s e r v i c e s 7.5%, 
excursion/tours 1.5% and contract /pr ivate 
h i re 24.9%. 
One notable feature of deregulation was 
that the four municipal operations became 
limited companies. Unlike in England, the 
Scottish Bus Group was not privatised and 
i t s operating subsidiar ies are s t i l l in 
public ownership. 
Findings to April 1987 
The following summary of the authors' 
findings i s presented as a se r ies of 
conclusions and recommendations, together 
with speculation as to possible future 
trends. 
I t should be made clear that i t i s as yet 
too early to make def in i t ive judgements 
about the effects of deregulation in 
Scotland. S tab i l i ty in terms of supply 
and market has not yet been achieved and 
the implications for regional councils' 
revenue support payments have not yet 
worked through the system. I t w i l l 
probably be 1988 a t l eas t before firm 
assessments on the situation can be made. 
I t should also be noted that changes 
through Scot land have been fa r from 
uniform and g e n e r a l i s a t i o n i s often 
difficult. Nevertheless some trends can 
be picked out and certainly the nature of 
changes to date can be reported. 
Competition 
The Act clearly had the effect of bringing 
competition into local bus operations, to 
varying degrees in different areas but 
generally focussing on the large urban 
markets. Glasgow quickly emerged as the 
area of f i e r c e s t compet i t ion , which 
occurred mainly between SBG subsidiaries 
on the one hand, and the Strathclyde Buses 
(the former PTE undertaking) on the other. 
This resulted in a sharp increase in 
supply in the central area and much-
publicised congestion. Peripheral housing 
es ta tes also received increased service 
levels with an independent ope ra to r , 
Magicbus, competing in these areas too. 
Minibuses have been used to provide high 
frequency services and to penetrate deeper 
into public housing areas. 
Strong competition also quickly emerged in 
Edinburgh, again between the SBG and the 
former municipal undertaking (Lothian), 
though th i s was l e s s intense than in 
Glasgow. Dundee and Aberdeen were slower 
to show s t rong compet i t ion but from 
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February 1987 this appeared, particularly 
in Aberdeen, again between the SBG 
(Northern S c o t t i s h ) and the former 
municipal operator (Grampian). 
There appear to be two se ts of problems 
a r i s i n g from the s i t u a t i o n so f a r . 
F i r s t l y , in order to achieve competition 
i t i s necessary to have two or more large 
operators in a terri tory. In Fife Region, 
there i s no large operator to challenge 
the dominance of the SBG subsidiary (Fife 
Scott ish) and t h i s has implicat ions for 
the tendering process, as noted below. 
Secondly, i t has been alleged that the SBG 
s u b s i d i a r i e s are competing u n f a i r l y 
because they are drawing on reserves to 
f i n a n c e a l e v e l of s e r v i c e which 
represents an oversupply for the market, 
in an effort to drive competitors out of 
the scenario altogether. This i s the main 
form taken by competition so far , though 
some fares competition can also be seen. 
A formal complaint along these l ines has 
been made to the OFT by Strathclyde Buses 
and the outcome i s awaited with interest. 
There has been an increase in the supply 
of bus services. The Scot t ish Office 
estimates that following deregulation the 
t o t a l bus mi leage in Scot land has 
increased from 177 mil l ion miles to 182 
million miles, a 2.8% rise. They estimate 
t h a t in Glasgow veh ic l e mi les have 
increased by 25%. In Lothian the increase 
i s given as 9%, with 3% in Edinburgh 
i t s e l f and 24% in the surrounding 
d is t r ic ts . In the rural areas covered by 
the Scottish Office/Newcastle University 
study (Dumfries and Galloway Region), 
North East Fife, Badenoch and Strathspey, 
and Inverness and Lochaber dis tr ic ts) a 3% 
increase in vehicle mileage is estimated. 
These figures suggest that overal l local 
bus mileage in Scotland has increased by 
about 14%. In c o n t r a s t the au thors 
est imate that the number of journeys has 
increased by only 1.3%. 
This increased level of suply does not 
appear to be tenable in the long run. 
Already there are indications that the bus 
companies are desperately trying to reduce 
costs in order to maintain services at the 
present level. The SBG efforts to reduce 
their wage bi l l s led to widespread strikes 
in July. Nevertheless, the authors are 
strongly of the opinion that there will be 
s u b s t a n t i a l r educ t i ons in s e r v i c e s , 
par t icu la r ly in the c i t i e s , in the near 
future. 
There has been l i t t l e expansion by 
independent operators so far , with the 
no tab le except ion of the Perth-based 
Stagecoach group which a l so expanded 
rapidly when express coach services were 
deregulated. There appear to be two main 
reasons for the lack of change in the 
independent sector. Firstly, some of them 
appear to be waiting unt i l the market 
set t les down - probably in 1988- and the 
excess supply has been reduced before 
deciding on long term s t r a t e g i e s . 
Secondly, the entry or expansion costs of 
es tabl ishing a f l ee t of buses (say 30) 
capable of competing with the SBG 
s u b s i d i a r i e s can be very l a r g e and 
therefore a significant deterrent. 
Fares 
Although compet i t ion has mainly been 
expressed in terms of leve l -of -serv ice , 
there i s also competition on fares. This 
has not taken the form of a genera l 
reduction but rather reductions designed 
to exploit the greater demand elas t ic i t ies 
of optional t ravel in specific market 
segments (shoppers, OAPs, young people) or 
season t i cke t s offering discounts. The 
la t te r may cover no more than 10-15% of an 
operator 's market but the benefi ts in 
product loyalty are fe l t to be worthwhile. 
Such season tickets typically offer a wide 
range of discounts, up to about 25% off 
fu l l fare. On the negative side, some 
passengers have been faced with higher 
costs of t r ave l , two t r i p types being 
affected in par t i cu la r : school pupils 
acustomed to hal f - fare t ravel at lunch 
t imes have l o s t t h i s concession in 
Strathclyde, for example; and through 
journeys involving competing operators are 
more expensive since through-ticketing is 
not available. 
Cross-subsidy 
This remains an important element in 
o p e r a t o r s ' commercial ( r e g i s t e r e d ) 
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networks . I t has not been ' squeezed ou t ' 
by competition and i s indeed the mechanism 
being used t o suppor t compe t i t i on as 
operators move resources round to confront 
c o m p e t i t o r s or r e t a i n a ' t e r r i t o r y ' . I t 
i s a l s o t h e b a s i s of many o f f peak 
o p e r a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y e v e n i n g and 
Sunday s e r v i c e s . An i n c r e a s e i n 
compe t i t i on which reduces an o p e r a t o r s ' 
revenue w i l l therefore tend to reduce the 
cross-subsidy avai lable t o these types of 
services , and cutbacks w i l l follow as has 
already occurred. 
The a l t e r n a t i v e of f a r e s i n c r e a s e s t o 
maintain revenue i s being avoided as much 
a s p o s s i b l e b u t i n f l a t i o n a l o n e i s 
p r o v i d i n g some p r e s s u r e i n t h i s 
d i rec t ion. Another a l t e rna t ive , tha t of 
increased efficiency and reduced cos t s , i s 
being app l i ed but may no t y i e l d much 
f u r t h e r saving . A consequence i s t h e 
t e n d e n c y f o r wage l e v e l s t o f a l l a s 
premium day and over t ime payments a r e 
avoided as far as possible. 
Tendering 
The po l i cy of a l l r e g i o n a l c o u n c i l s has 
been t o seek r e i n s t a t e m e n t of n o n -
r e g i s t e r e d r o u t e s through the t ende r ing 
process, but frequencies have been allowed 
t o f a l l in off -peak s e r v i c e s and in some 
r u r a l a r e a s . Also some r o u t e s have been 
truncated and diverted, leaving consumers 
w i t h r e d u c e d f r e q u e n c i e s o r g r e a t e r 
w a l k i n g d i s t a n c e s . Network package 
t ende r ing in F i f e appears t o have had 
d i s a p p o i n t i n g r e s u l t s from the l o c a l 
authori ty viewpoint . The l a r g e packages 
o f f e r e d f o r t e n d e r p r e v e n t e d s m a l l 
independent operators from competing and 
a l l o w e d F i f e S c o t t i s h (SBG) to o f f e r 
d i s c o u n t i n g on whole packages to s ecu re 
tenders . 
In gene ra l compe t i t i on for tendering has 
been l e s s forthcoming than ant ic ipated by 
t h e 'Buses ' White Paper. This i s p a r t l y 
due to the smal l independents ' l i m i t e d 
f l e e t s ize and par t ly to t he i r preference 
for waiting upon the outcome of the early 
stages of deregulation. The costs /savings 
to local authori ty revenue support budgets 
show a va r i ed p a t t e r n on which i t i s too 
early to make def in i t ive judgements. Some 
appear t o have made f i n a n c i a l s av ings , 
w h i l e o t h e r s have had to i n c r e a s e t h e i r 
subsidy e x p e n d i t u r e . However, given the 
current i n s t a b i l i t y in the industry i t i s 
impossible a t the present time to make any 
firm judgements on the overall outcome. 
Office of Fair Trading 
One disappointing feature of deregulation 
t o d a t e has been the r o l e of the OFT. 
There had been v a r i o u s compla in t s about 
u n f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n and a n t i - c o m p e t i t i v e 
prac t ices . The s izes of the Scot t i sh Bus 
Group and the four ex-municipal operators 
are such tha t i t i s very d i f f i c u l t for the 
smaller independents t o compete with them, 
and t h e r e i s t h e r e f o r e a very impor t an t 
r o l e for the OFT t o ensure t h a t t h e r e i s 
f a i r competition in the industry. 
Unfo r tuna te ly , the OFT has shown g r e a t 
r e l u c t a n c e t o dea l wi th the compla in t s 
made t o i t and w h e r e i s has become 
involved i t s p rocedures a re very slow. 
T h e r e i s a r e a l d a n g e r t h a t some 
i n d e p e n d e n t s w i l l be f o r c e d o u t of 
b u s i n e s s w h i l e t h e OFT i s s t i l l 
c o n s i d e r i n g the c a s e s in q u e s t i o n . A 
p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m h a s a r i s e n where 
companies have l o s t tendered s e r v i c e s t o 
o t h e r o p e r a t o r s but have subsequent ly 
decided to run commercial s e r v i c e s in 
d i r e c t compe t i t i on wi th the subs id i sed 
s e r v i c e s . In some ca se s t h e companies 
i n v o l v e d h a v e run f r e e bus s e r v i c e s , 
presumably in an e f f o r t t o fo rce t h e i r 
competitors out of business. 
The inab i l i t y or slowness in dealing with 
t h e s e problems, i s , in the opinion of the 
authors , one of the major def ic iencies of 
the present system. The "policing" of the 
1 9 8 5 A c t n e e d s t o be i m p r o v e d 
subs tan t i a l ly . 
Conclusions 
There has been an i n c r e a s e in t h e supply 
of bus s e r v i c e s i n S c o t l a n d s i n c e 
d e r e g u l a t i o n in October 1986. I t i s 
estimated t ha t veh ic le mi leage has r i s e n 
by about 14%. In c o n t r a s t , the number of 
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passengers has increased by only 1.3$ so 
far. 
Much of the i nc rease in s e r v i c e s i s 
attributable to a duplication of services, 
particularly in Glasgow and Edinburgh, so 
the benefi ts to consumers may not be as 
great as might be inferred. Another point 
to s t r e s s i s tha t there has been a net 
increase in peak (daytime) services but a 
net decrease in offpeak (evening and 
weekend) s e r v i c e s . As fa r as r u r a l 
services are concerned there appears to 
have been l i t t l e change. The main reason 
for t h i s has been the pol ic ies of most 
regional a tuhor i t i e s to try to maintain 
such services at the i r pre-deregulation 
l eve l and t h e r e f o r e "buy-back" those 
s e r v i c e s which were not r e g i s t e r e d 
commercially. 
Continuity of services has been adversely 
affected in two main respects . F i r s t l y , 
there have been a l o t of changes and a 
lack of information about them. This was 
probably an i n e v i t a b l e problem of 
deregulation, the purpose of which was 
radical change, and should reduce over 
time as the new system of services set t les 
down. 
Overall, the authors would summarise the 
effects of deregulation on supply and fare 
l e v e l s as being t o i n c r e a s e o v e r a l l 
supply, though with decreases in offpeak 
and low patronage routes , and to reduce 
f a r e l e v e l s fo r t h o s e t r a v e l l i n g 
frequently in the peak or in specif ic 
market segments in the offpeak. The 
supply i n c r e a s e s , however, may be 
temporary as o p e r a t o r s move t h e i r 
resources around an area to maintain 
competition. Supply l e v e l s may a l so 
decrease if, as has been alleged, some 
operators are financing their competitive 
e f f o r t from r e s e r v e s in an "unfa i r " 
manner. 
Most l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s have adopted 
policies of trying to maintain services at 
their pre-deregulation levels and have not 
therefore sought to "buy-back" services 
which were not commercially regis tered. 
The f i n a n c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of these 
pol ic ies are not yet c lear , but there 
seems to be increasing evidence of a r ise 
in the subsidy required. However, there 
a re a few examples, notably in the 
Highlands, where competitive tendering has 
generated savings. 
The system of "po l i c ing" the 1985 
Transpor t Act appears to be causing 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , apa r t from the safe ty 
aspects of bus operation. The Traffic 
Commissioner/Office of Fa i r Trading 
func t ions have been c r i t i c i s e d as 
partially ineffective or too slow. There 
appear to be part icular problems because 
of the inability or reluctance of the OFT 
to investigate cases in Scotland. 
I t i s very unlikely that the oversupply of 
bus services a t the present time wi l l be 
reduced by a substant ia l increase in 
demand. I t i s much more likely that there 
wi l l be cuts in services in the near 
future, par t i cu la r ly in the four main 
c i t ies . Until services have settled down 
to a reasonably stable level, i t would be 
premature to reach firm conclusions on the 
effects of deregulation. 
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